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Introduction
Economists have a long standing experience in capturing the incentives of taxation on microeconomic decision behavior. Approaches based on the neoclassical investment theory (Hall and Jorgenson (1967) , King and Fullerton (1984) , Devereux and Griffith (1999) ) consistently reveal the distorting effects of taxation, particularly on corporate investment and financing decisions. However, their microeconomic foundation prevents these models from being applicable for purposes other than the identification of tax incentives on rational, i.e. tax minimizing, representative agents. As a consequence, the coherent analysis of implications of tax reforms for tax revenue and the distribution of tax consequences across firms has remained a largely unresolved issue. Still, providing this information to decision makers is required of comprehensive economic tax policy analysis. Otherwise, a thorough ex ante evaluation of existing tax regimes and possible reform scenarios is not feasible. We present a corporate microsimulation model -ZEW TaxCoMM -which closes the identified methodological gap. In its current stage of development, ZEW TaxCoMM is designed particularly to simulate German corporate tax law and corresponding reforms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we highlight the central challenges corporate microsimulation models have to meet. Furthermore, we provide a review of existing models and contrast their fundamental characteristics with the ZEW TaxCoMM approach. Section 3 provides a brief outline of its basic idea and structure. In Section 4, the ZEW TaxCoMM will be employed for evaluating the German corporate tax reform 2008 that constitutes a typical tax rate cut cum base broadening reform with particular restrictions on the deduction of interest expenses. Resorting on a broad sample of heterogeneous firms, ZEW TaxCoMM determines how the tax burden is distributed according to sector and company size and establishes a relation between firm characteristics and the impact of the tax reform.
Moreover the reform induced changes in tax revenue are derived. Section 5 derives policy implications in view of an economic crisis. Section 6 concludes.
Corporate Microsimulation as an Instrument of Tax Policy Analysis
Microsimulation models, by definition, trace or simulate all analytically relevant processes and interdependencies at the lowest level of aggregation, i.e. the single economic agent. Due to their micro-level perspective, these models are able to precisely capture central agent characteristics and their response to (alternative) legal settings (Creedy (2001) ). Since microsimulation models do not only rely on one economic agent but process real data on a vast num-ber of subjects, they are able to broadly and authentically anticipate the consequences of policy reforms (Orcutt et al. (1976) ). With special regard to tax reform scenarios, the ex ante assessment of corresponding distributional and revenue implications becomes possible. Indeed, microsimulation models of households have already been successfully applied in the evaluation of transfer and benefit policies (see inter alia Fuest et al. (2005) , Arntz et al. (2008) ). 1 However, up to now, they have been less established for the analysis of the corporate sector (Bardazzi et al. (2004) ).
On the one hand, as compared to household data, the availability of quantitative micro information on firms has traditionally been more limited. Especially in Europe, databases with firm-level financial accounting information have emerged only in recent years. The access to comprehensive original tax data is even more restricted. In Germany, official firm-level tax data is available for selected flow variables only. Hence, the duality of financial and tax accounting is one of the major challenges corporate microsimulation has to cope with. While household microsimulation models can directly refer to economic flow data, corporate microsimulation must possibly process a multitude of stock and flow variables from the financial accounting sphere and transform them according to tax accounting provisions. Otherwise, the model might only be able to capture the effect of a change in nominal tax rates, rather than a reform of tax base regulations. Another issue closely linked to the aspect of data availability is the models' capacity to allow for general conclusions with respect to the whole population of corporate firms. If the microsimulation is based on a representative sample, there should not be such a problem. However, particularly samples of firm-level financial accounting data rarely fulfill this criterion. Still, based on detailed aggregate information covering the total population of firms, an appropriate weighting scheme might be constructed even for arbitrary, i.e. non-random, samples. In this case, conclusions referring to the whole population of firms could still be drawn.
On the other hand, a second source of increased complexity is the existence of inter-temporal effects of tax provisions governing the tax base (depreciation, loss offset, etc.) which go beyond the merely one-periodic perspective in the tax assessment of households. Consequently, the time horizon covered by corporate microsimulation should also be multi-periodic in 1 A comprehensive overview of these household microsimulation models is provided by O'Hare and Gupta (2000) and -with a special focus on Germany -by Wagenhals (2004). order to consistently trace firm-level developments of fundamental tax base variables over time (dynamic microsimulation).
Defining these sources of conceptual complexity as central requirements of corporate microsimulation models allows categorising existing models relative to the new approach represented by the ZEW TaxCoMM and described in more detail in Section 3. In total, three corporate microsimulation models with a specific focus on tax policy evaluation exist (see Table 1 ). Precisely, these are the Italian microsimulation model DIECOFIS, a model provided by the Canadian ministry of finance and BizTax, a microsimulation approach designed to analyse business tax reforms in Germany which has been put forward by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). The Italian DIECOFIS 2 project led to the development of a corporate microsimulation model under the aegis of the Italian statistical office ISTAT (Castelluci et al. (2003) , Oropallo and Parisi (2005) ). The DIECOFIS microsimulation model is a one-periodic model based on cross-sectional real financial accounting data. The representative dataset (29,196 corporations, reporting year 2000) underlying the DIECOFIS model has been assembled from numerous sources comprising published financial statements and survey data on Italian firms. In order to simulate the corporate tax burden of companies, the given financial accounting data are first transformed into tax data. Subsequently, the firm-specific corporate income is computed in a very detailed way and then multiplied with the statutory corporate income tax rate. (2008)).
The design of the ZEW TaxCoMM has in part been inspired by these existing approaches.
However, offering broad analytical capacities within a multi-periodic framework, the new model goes beyond prior approaches and thus closes a gap in the conceptual design of corporate microsimulation models. Precisely, ZEW TaxCoMM is the first microsimulation model which allows for a detailed assessment of all major elements forming the tax bases for profit taxes including e.g. depreciation, thin capitalization rules and loss offset as well as tax regulations concerning different types of provisions. The BizTax model may even resort to a long-term projection up to the year 2015 The Federal Statistical Office has provided us with a special evaluation of the corporate income tax statistic. It contains tabulations in much higher detail than those in the standard version.
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The procedure thus implicitly assumes that within each activity-income-class, the ratio between gross corporate taxable income and individual balance sheet or profit and loss account items of firms not included in the sample on average corresponds to that of corporations covered by the dataset. Due to the panel structure of the exploited financial accounts data, ZEW TaxCoMM is able to take the intertemporal effects of tax provisions into account. In this regard it thus contrasts with other microsimulation models which resort to mainly cross-sectional tax data as principal source of information. Furthermore, ZEW TaxCoMM is capable of tracing the consequences of changes in tax provisions in high detail, since it derives flow data from financial stock data and thereby allows a detailed simulation of firm specific tax assessment. Precisely, all relevant tax data is computed "bottom-up" on the basis of financial accounts and not exogenously taken as input from other primary sources.
As a central link between both the financial accounting and the tax accounting sphere, ZEW TaxCoMM • Exploit and never contradict all available information from financial statements • Consistently trace firm-level developments over time
• Opt for the most realistic assumption with regard to firm-level choices, even if it is not in line with tax-minimizing behaviour • Modules must easily adapt to different tax regulations and reform scenarios In a second stage of the microsimulation procedure, the identified required modifications are applied to the profit on ordinary activities for each firm separately. For a concise explanation of the principles and technicalities of the German tax and business law, see Wolff et al. (2005) . For a more detailed description of ZEW TaxCoMM see Reister et al. (2008) . 10 The periodic cash flow used follows the definition of the Society of Investment Professionals in Germany (Schmalenbach Association). It is reduced by cash flow arising from tax-exempt foreign income.
( ) ( ) ( ) Conceptually, the approach chosen here combines a forward-looking perspective with a backward-looking foundation. It is backward-looking in that it resorts to historic real data instead of relying on hypothetic investments but forward-looking since the impact of tax reforms on an important investor's target variable can be simulated endogenously.
Validating ZEW TaxCoMM
Validating ZEW TaxCoMM is not an easy task since tax statistics do not report disaggregated data on firm specific tax due. Yet, as regards the validation at firm level, ZEW TaxCoMM's capability to consistently approximate tax bases and hence, resulting corporate income and trade taxes due can be evaluated on the basis of information about taxes paid on income included in the ZEW TaxCoMM data sample taken from the DAFNE database for the corresponding years 2003 to 2005. However, this is a relatively rough approach since the financial accounting item "taxes on profit" reflects tax prepayments, tax refunds and deferred taxes within a reporting period. Thus, it might significantly deviate from the tax due for that specific period. However, for companies with relatively stable profits over time, both variables should be rather close. Therefore, validation of the ZEW TaxCoMM will rely on comparing computed taxes due with taxes paid on profits for this type of companies. In total, 129 companies belong to this group of firms with a very smooth profit dynamic (+/-5% over all three years considered). Looking at the relative gap between the simulated tax due and financial "taxes on profit", the corresponding mean relative deviation for all 387 observations amounts to 2.0% if outlying results (below respectively higher than 1st and 99th percentiles) are eliminated. We conclude that there is no considerable systematic deviation of the ZEW TaxCoMM microsimulation results from underlying "real" taxes due.
That the gross taxable income is very realistically simulated is also confirmed in course of the extrapolation of the dataset. In this context, the intervals of gross taxable corporate income for which the Federal Statistical office refuses to report the number of firms 11 match with those intervals to which we allocate only a few firms on the basis of ZEW TaxCoMM. This would not be the case if ZEW TaxCoMM would systematically over-or underestimate the actual income.
Assessing the 2008 German Corporate Tax Reform from a Micro-Perspective

Regulatory changes in detail
The consequences of the German corporate tax reform 2008 are still at the heart of an ongoing academic and political debate. The reform followed a persistent international trend of cutting tax rates and financing these tax rate cuts by broadening the tax base. In order to broaden the tax base, countries increasingly tend to detach the corporate income tax base from profits by including non-deductible business expenses. Prominent examples are thin-capitalisation or earning-stripping rules that aim at limiting debt financing within group structures. An even broader concept of restricting the deductibility of interest expenses applies for instance in Denmark, Italy and since the 2008 reform also in Germany. In these countries, the nondeductible interest expenses not only capture interest on shareholder loans, but regulations restrict the deductibility for all interest expenses in excess of a predefined ratio of total assets or EBITDA. Besides interest expenses, the use of losses is often restricted as well. As regards local taxes on corporations, they are either directly based on capital instead of profits (e.g.
"taxe professionnelle" in France) or apply to a tax base that taxes also business expenses (e.g.
interest add-backs for trade tax in Germany and interest as well as labour cost add-backs for "IRAP" in Italy). To sum up, the German tax reform follows a distinct and internationally prevalent pattern that is not unique to the German tax system. Hence, its evaluation also provides valuable insights into the general implications of tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms on heterogeneous firms. The regulatory changes underlying the analysis will be sketched in the following.
The German tax law as of the year 2007 constitutes the reference tax system which serves as the natural benchmark to assess the reform-induced changes in firm-level effective tax burdens.
12 Table 5 juxtaposes the basic elements of the reference tax system 2007 and the corresponding major changes in tax regulations implemented in the course of the corporate tax reform. Table 5 shows that the 2008 reform is characterized by broadening the profit tax bases (abolishment of declining balance depreciation, additional restrictions concerning loss offset, stronger limitations of interest deductibility) accompanied by a reduction of profit tax rates (corporate income tax rate is reduced from 25% to 15%, trade tax rate from 16.67% to 14% if an average municipal multiplier of 400% is assumed). The central aims of the corporate tax reform as declared by the German federal government were the improvement of Germany's location attractiveness from a tax perspective, by cutting profit tax rates and the enhancement of tax neutrality with respect to the choice of legal form as well as financing decisions (Bundestag (2007) ). Furthermore, companies as well as local and federal governments should benefit from an improved planning reliability. After all, a major focus of the entire reform has been put on the sustained strengthening of the German tax base. As a consequence, revenue neutrality played a major role in the design of the reform.
Implications of the German Corporate Tax Reform on the Distribution of the Tax Burden Across Firms
As a primary output, ZEW TaxCoMM calculates the annual tax due at the level of each firm.
To gain insight in the distribution of the tax burden across companies of different sizes and economic activity, the following analysis is based on the effective tax burden on cash flow ( Table 6 ). The effective tax burden on cash flow, as shown in Section 3, represents the tax induced relative cut of the future value of periodical pre-tax cash flow. After the corporate tax reform of 2008, the effective tax burden on cash flow varies between 7.86% for medium-sized corporations in the energy sector and 23.15% for small corporations in the service sector. The average decline in the tax burden is highest for small corporations (5.97 percentage points) and lowest for large corporations (2.80 percentage points). The reduction of the tax burden for large corporations is comparably low since large corporations are to a greater extend subject to newly implemented interest deduction ceiling regulations and extended interest add-backs. The average share of corporations underlying the interest deduction ceiling regulation, for instance, amounts to 6.73% for large corporations as opposed to virtually 0% for small corporations and 0.11% for medium-sized corporations. The extent to which tax rate cuts translate into a decrease in the effective tax burden is closely related to the profitability of the corporation. 14 In contrast, structural ratios such as debt ratio and capital intensity indicate the exposure of corporations to elements of the reform which broaden the tax base. Therefore, companies of high profitability, low debt ratio and low capital intensity are largely expected to gain most from the reform. By capturing the heterogeneity of firms, ZEW TaxCoMM can very precisely illustrate this issue. Table 8 matches the reduction in the effective tax burden on cash flow with the relevant financial ratios of the corporations in the sample. Precisely, the reduction in the tax burden is separated into quarters, the boundaries of which are defined by the quartiles given in Table 7 . For each quarter, Table 8 shows the corresponding median of financial ratios across those companies contained in that respective quarter. each quarter of the reduction in effective tax burden on cash flow the corresponding median of profitability, debt ratio and capital intensity across companies contained in the respective quarter. The results are based upon the extrapolated sample. The boundaries of the quarters are defined by the quartiles of the distribution given in Table 7 . Profitability is defined as the 3-year average ratio of annual profit of ordinary activity to annual balance sheet total. The 3-year average ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to annual balance sheet total yields the debt ratio. The capital intensity is given by the 3-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet total. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM ZEW TaxCoMM shows that corporations falling into the lowest quarter of the reduction in the effective tax burden are indeed of low profitability, largely debt financed and show a high capital intensity. Hence, while these corporations benefit from tax rate cuts to a comparably smaller extent, their tax burden is hit particularly hard by extended interest add-backs, the interest deduction ceiling regulations and the abolition of the declining balance depreciation.
Vice versa, the decline in the effective average tax burden is most accentuated for highly profitable corporations with a low debt ratio and low capital intensity. Corporations falling into the third or forth quarter, i.e. experiencing a reduction in the effective tax burden of more than 5.28 percentage points, are of a similarly high profitability. Yet, the 25% of corporations that benefit most from the corporate tax reform feature, in addition to the high profitability, a considerably lower debt ratio and a lower capital intensity. Table 7 clearly indicated that a vast majority of corporations experiences a decline in the effective tax burden on cash flow. Table 8 matched the degree of reduction in effective tax burden up with corresponding financial ratios. Table 9 takes a complementary look at the distribution of winners and losers across company sizes and economic activities. The share of "winners" ranges from 73.68% for large corporations in the energy sector to 98.13% for medium-sized corporations in the construction sector. With regard to all economic activities, the highest share of "winners" can be stated for small corporations and the lowest share for large corporations. Despite the important tax rate cuts, there is still a distinct share of corporations that do not benefit from the tax reform but incur an increase in the effective tax burden on cash flow. This result holds true for each size range and economic activity. Table 10 provides an insight in the determinants for being a "winner" or "loser" of the tax reform and strengthens the arguments brought forward to explain the differentials in tax burden reductions. High profitability, low debt ratio and low capital intensity favour a reduction in the tax burden and therefore characterise the "winner" of the reform. However, if companies face a lower profitability, rely heavily on debts and have a huge share of tangible fixed assets, they are more likely to lose with regard to the tax reform of 2008. These sector-specific indications are in line with the more general analysis in Table 8 . Tax   Burden   Tables 8 and 10 provide some insights into the characteristics of firms and economic sectors that benefit to a higher or lower degree from the tax reform. However, it should be interesting to see the marginal effects of firm characteristics on the reform induced reduction in firmlevel effective tax rates. For this purpose, we run some straightforward regression analysis using ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). 15 The baseline equation is indeed kept very simple as there should be only a few variables which have an impact on firm-level reform consequences. We regress the reduction in the effective tax rate (Reduc) of firm i = 1,.. N on the profitability (ProfitR), the debt ratio (DebtR) and the capital intensity (CapR). 16 The estima- The result from this estimation is given in column (1) of Table 11 . As expected, the coefficient of profitability is positive. An increase in profitability by one percentage point would raise the reform induced reduction in the effective tax burden by 0.07 percentage points. The impact of the capital intensity is negative, since the tax reform abolished the declining balance depreciation. When controlling for industry fixed effects, the results remain unchanged (column (2) of Table 11 ).
Estimating the Effects of Firm Characteristics on the Reduction in the Effective
An additional specification accounts for the fact that the reform might hit firms differently according to their size. Consequently, the effect of firm characteristics on the reduction of the tax burden might depend on the size of the firm. A dummy variable L is therefore introduced for large firms as well as an interaction of L with profitability, debt ratio and capital intensity.
The results are shown in column (3) of Table 11 . For large corporations, the increase of profitability by one percentage point triggers an increase in the reduction of the tax burden of 0.09 16 The financial ratios referred to in this analysis are again defined as in the previous section: The profitability of a corporation is defined as the 3-year average ratio of annual profit of ordinary activity to annual balance sheet total. The 3-year average ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to annual balance sheet total yields the debt ratio. The capital intensity is given by the 3-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet total.
percentage points 17 which is considerably higher compared to the baseline specification. For large corporations, an increase in profitability seems to pay off more in terms of reform induced reduction in the effective tax burden. This might be the case because a higher profitability and thus higher EBITDA potentially prevents firms from being captured by the interest deduction ceiling regulation or at least increases the amount of deductible interest expenses. Note: This table displays the results of the OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The dummy variable DB indicates if the firm applied the declining balance depreciation prior to the reform. The dummy variable L designates firms that are classified as large corporations with total assets exceeding € 16,060,000. To identify firms which are subject to the newly introduced interest deduction ceiling regulation, the dummy variable IDCR is introduced. Specification (2) controls for industry fixed effects.
The effect of the debt ratio turns out to be negative for large firms (-0.06) but positive, though very small, for small and medium-sized corporations (0.005). This result suggests that broadening the tax base by restricting the deductibility of interest expenses hits large corporations
harder. An increase in debts relative to total assets is ceteris paribus related to a lower benefit from the tax reform in terms of reduction in the effective tax burden. The incidence of firms being subject to the interest deduction ceiling regulation is much smaller for small and medium sized corporations due to the exemption threshold of € 1 million. Moreover, small firms might even benefit from the newly introduced exemption of up to € 100,000 of interest expenses from add-backs for trade tax purposes thus explaining the slightly positive coefficient for the debt ratio. For larger firms, the exemption limit presumably does not outweigh the higher burden resulting from adding back 25% of all interest expenses instead of 50% of interest on long term debt. The coefficient of capital intensity is -0.012 for large corporations and thus comparably low with respect to the other specifications.
In an additional step, we distinguish between firms that are subject to the interest deduction ceiling regulation and those that are not. Therefore a dummy variable (IDCR) is introduced, indicating if a company is subject to this regulation. Again, interaction terms between IDCR and the financial ratios are included as well. Column (4) of Table 11 summarizes the result for this specification. Most remarkably, the coefficient of the debt ratio decreases to -0.71 for companies subject to the considered regulation. Hence, at the condition that the interest deduction ceiling regulation applies, an increase of the debt ratio by one percentage point drives down the reduction in the effective tax burden by 0.71 percentage points. This effect is comparably strong since any additional interest expense is not tax deductible. The coefficient of profitability is positive since an increase in profitability and thus in EBITDA results ceteris paribus in a higher amount of deductible interest expenses.
Revenue Consequences of the German Corporate Tax Reform
To shed light on the reform induced changes in the tax revenue, ZEW TaxCoMM aggregates the firm specific tax due for each year. The results are displayed in In the short run, when disregarding behavioural responses to changes in the tax system, the corporate tax reform 2008 results in a decline in tax revenues. The deficiency as simulated by ZEW TaxCoMM amounts to a total of € 9.817 billion and splits up into a loss of € 5.808 billion from corporate income tax, a loss of € 3.688 billion from trade tax and a loss of € 0.376 billion from the solidarity surcharge.
It is reasonable to compare the revenue effects computed by ZEW TaxCoMM with the outcomes of other approaches. Besides ZEW TaxCoMM, the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundestag (2007)) as well as Bach et al. (2007) and Radulescu/Stimmelmayr (2010) provide estimates on how the reform affects tax revenues. The results put forward by Bach et al. (2007) rely on the BizTax model which primarily determines the impact of tax rate cuts and trade tax regulations on tax revenues.
18 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010) According to the Federal Ministry of Finance, the presumed financing gap of the corporate tax reform totals € 10.701 billion.
19 For comparison, the revenue loss computed by ZEW TaxCoMM is € 9.817 billion and thus about € 900 million lower. This deviation does not seem implausibly high. ZEW TaxCoMM simulates the considered tax base regulations more precisely at micro level and thus derives revenue gains from the broadening of the tax base that outweigh the effect from the tax rate cut to a larger extent.
Implications for Reforming Corporate Taxation in Germany and Other Countries
By establishing a relation between firm characteristics and the impact of the corporate tax reform 2008, the analysis in Section 4.2 and 4.3 provided evidence that companies losing from the reform feature a low profitability, a high debt ratio and a high capital intensity.
About 5% of all corporations can be deemed to be loosing from the reform. While these firms benefit less from the tax rate cut, they are more heavily exposed to the tax base broadening 18 As opposed to the ZEW TaxCoMM, the BizTax model does not precisely simulate tax base regulations. 19 These are deficiencies in revenue collected from corporations. The share of trade tax collected from corporations is approximated with 55% of total trade tax. The share of solidarity surcharge on corporate income is approximated with 11% of total solidarity surcharge revenue. The displayed loss is net of those revenue gains the Ministry presumes to earn from the self-financing effect of the reform and from special restrictions on tax avoidance (e.g. relocation of functions, security lending) (Bundestag (2007) p. 39).
regulations which finance the tax rate cuts. In two regards, this result bears high relevance in view of the current economic crisis. On the one hand, the number of losers will presumably rise. On the other hand, by causing earnings and investments to plummet while the cost of financing soars, the economic crisis hits the losers of the reform especially hard. While the increase in demand and costs of debt financing raises the overall amount of interest expenses, the decrease in profitability and EBITDA lowers the amount of interest expenses that is deductible for tax purposes. Moreover, higher interest expenses increase the tax burden from interest add-backs for trade tax purposes. Hence, the losers of the reform see their tax burden increase even more as compared to the pre-reform tax regime. Based on the regression results, the base line specification (column (1) of to rely more heavily on debt financing due to liquidity constraints, an increase in the debt ratio of 20% reduces the benefit of the tax reform by 1.2 percentage points for large corporations and by 10.4 percentage points for companies already subject to the interest deduction ceiling regulation.
Consequently, by taxing an increasing amount of non-deductible expenses, the tax reform imposes additional restrictions on the liquidity of corporations thus reinforcing the negative implications of the crises on the financial situation of corporations. While this situation causes massive need for company restructuring, the very same is constrained by the regulation that bans loss set off when substantial changes in shareholder occur. To sum up, a tax rate cut cum base broadening reform especially when detaching the tax base from profits by banning the deduction of business expenses, additionally endangers the existence of firms in times of massive economic downturn. This finding has been exemplarily illustrated for the German corporate tax reform 2008, but similar consequences can be stated for other countries with comparable patterns of corporate taxation.
The governments of these countries now took measures to relieve companies from an additional tax burden in times of drastic economic downturn. These measures mainly focus on regulations considered as harmful in times of economic crisis, i.e. regulations that detach the tax base from profits. To name some examples, France intents to abolish the regional nonprofit tax "taxe professionnelle" as of January 1 st 2010, and Italy will introduce some reliefs to its interest deduction ceiling regulation in terms of an EBITDA carry forward. The most important modifications planned or already implemented by the German government are roughly sketched in the following.
As regards the interest deduction ceiling regulation, the exemption limit has been raised from € one million to € three million ( § 4h II 1 a ITA) 20 . Moreover, the government intends to mitigate the pro-cyclical effects of this regulation by introducing an EBITDA carry forward as of 2010. If interest expenses to be deducted for tax purposes are below 30% of EBITDA and no exemption or escape clause is used, it should be possible to carry forward the balance ( § 4h I ITA) 21 . An EBITDA carry forward thus increases the maximum amount of potentially deductible interest expenses in subsequent years. The tax burden from interest add-backs for trade tax purposes is relieved by reducing the share of interest included in rent and leasing expenses for immovable property from 65% to 50% ( § 8 No.1 e TTA) 22 .
The regulations governing the treatment of losses are modified in such a way that loss carryforwards are not lost if the acquired, loss-making firm is insolvent and its fundamental business structure is preserved after acquisition ( § 8c I a CTA) 23 . To facilitate business restructurings within groups, loss carry-forwards should no longer be lost if the buying and selling entity are directly or indirectly owned at 100% by a third party of that group ( § 8c I 5 CTA).
Moreover, loss carry-forwards should not be lost due to changes in the shareholding structure to the extent of hidden reserves included in domestic business property ( § 8c I 6 f CTA). To stimulate investments, the declining balance depreciation has been reintroduced at a rate of 25% for two years ( § 7 II ITA) 24 .
Conclusions
This paper presented a new corporate microsimulation model, ZEW TaxCoMM, which allows for the coherent micro-based analysis (ex ante and ex post) of reform induced revenue impli-In this paper, ZEW TaxCoMM was employed to evaluate the distributional and revenue consequences of the German corporate tax reform 2008. For 50% of the corporations in the sample, the effective tax burden on cash flow is reduced by between 1.13 and 8.4 percentage points. On the other hand, despite the important tax rate cuts, 5% of all firms considered experience an increasing or unchanged tax burden. As regards revenue implications, ZEW TaxCoMM determines average revenue losses of € 9.817 billion. The decline is higher for corporate income tax, the trade tax thus gaining in importance.
The German corporate tax reform 2008 followed the persistent international trend of tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms and especially of detaching the tax base from profits by restricting the deduction of business expenses. Hence, the results on the distribution of the tax burden according to firm characteristics stand exemplarily for other reforms following a similar pattern.
ZEW TaxCoMM shows explicitly that high profitability, low debt ratio and low capital intensity favour a strong decline in the tax burden measure. The results of a simple estimation approach with OLS confirm these findings for a ceteris paribus setting.
The analysis showed that tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms, especially when detaching the tax base from profits by banning the deduction of business expenses, additionally endanger the existence of firms in times of massive economic downturn. Policy makers in Germany and other countries reacted by modifying the most harmful regulations, which implied the taxation of economic worth instead of profits.
